

Page Denied

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/ICS		X		
4	DD/NFA		X		
5	DD/A		X		
6	DD/O		X		
7	DD/S&T		X		
8	GC		X		
9	LC				
10	IG				
11	Compt				
12	D/PA				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/ExStf				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/EAS/OPP		X		
18	Chm/NIC		X		
19	D/OPP		X		
20	C/CCS/ICS		X		
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE			
		Date			

Remarks:

Executive Secretary

6 October 1981

Date

3537 (12-77)

STAT

81-8453

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

II-90004

October 2, 1981


SECRET WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ✓
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Munitions/Technology Transfer to the People's
Republic of China (S)

The President has formally approved for implementation the attached
National Security Decision Directive on the Munitions/Technology
Transfer to the People's Republic of China. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

cc: The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

SECRET WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT

Review on October 1, 1987

L -117

SYSTEM II

90004

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 22, 1981

SECRETNATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 11MUNITIONS/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. The case-by-case consideration of requests by the People's Republic of China for munitions/technology transfers should be conducted on the basis of the following general principles:

-- U. S. munitions/technology transfers to China should minimize the national security risks in special mission areas of nuclear weapons or their delivery systems, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, or intelligence-gathering capabilities.

-- U. S. munitions/technology transfers should not contribute significantly to improvements in Chinese offensive and power-projection capabilities.

-- For requests which would enhance China's conventional defensive capabilities, the U. S. will be willing to consider the transfer of weapons, components, technical assistance and weapons technology (including some coproduction/licensed production where sensitive technologies are not involved).

-- For requests which fall into less clearly defensive categories, the U. S. will look first to the selective transfer of components and technical assistance rather than the transfer of complete weapons systems or their production technology.

-- U. S. classified military information will be disclosed in accordance with the criteria and procedures established by the National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1).

2. In implementing these general guidelines, the existing mechanism and process established for munitions/technology transfers will be applied by the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and any other concerned organization that a specific case may warrant. Consultations should be undertaken as appropriate with key Congressional leaders and with Allies and friends during the process of review.

SECRET

Review on September 23, 2001

Extended by RValien

Reason: NSC 1.13 (f)

